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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-COURTS-MARTIAL-POWER OF CONGRESS 
TO PROVIDE FOR MILITARY JURISDICTION OVER CIVILIANS-During 
the past term the Supreme Court decided three cases involving 
the constitutionality of court-martial jurisdiction over certain 
groups of civilians.1 In United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles2 the 
Court held that Congress could not constitutionally provide for 
military trial of a discharged serviceman for offenses committed 
during his term of service. In two subsequent cases3 the Court re-
jected the contention that the Toth decision announced a principle 
applicable to any exercise of jurisdiction over civilians by the 
military courts in upholding the provisions of the Uniform Code 
of Military Justice4 for military jurisdiction over civilian depend-
ents accompanying American servicemen abroad. This comment 
attempts to ascertain the principles upon which these decisions 
1 Previous decisions of the Court had not spelled out the constitutional limits with 
any degree of definiteness, and the lower court decisions were not at all uniform. In Ex 
parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 at 46, 63 S.Ct. 1 (1942), the Court specifically reserved the con• 
sideration of the limits of the jurisdiction of military tribunals. On the very point in• 
volved in the Toth decision there was a definite split of authority which had aroused 
considerable controversy. Compare Terry v. United States, (D.C. Wash. 1933) 2 F. Supp. 
962, with United States ex rel. Flannery v. Commanding General, (D.C. N.Y. 1946) 69 F. 
Supp. 661, reversed in unreported order of 2d Cir., No. 20235, April 18, 1946. See WIN· 
THROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 104 (1920). 
2 350 U.S. 11, 76 S.Ct. 1 (1955). 
3 Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470, 76 S.Ct. 886 (1956); Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487, 
76 S.Ct. 880 (1956). 
4 64 Stat. L. 108 (1950), 50 U.S.C. (1952) c. 22 (referred to in succeeding references as 
Uniform Code). 
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were based, and to determine their effect on present and potential 
provisions for military jurisdiction. 
I 
The need for some provision for the trial of servicemen for 
crimes committed while in the armed forces, but which were not 
discovered until after their discharge, had been recognized for 
some time before the passage of the Uniform Code.15 The need 
became particularly apparent when the Supreme Court held in 
1949 that under the then existing military law, a person in the 
service could not be tried for an offense committed during a 
previous term of service. 6 This decision was not placed on con-
stitutional grounds, but rather was based on the ground that, 
absent a provision by Congress for such trial, jurisdiction could 
not be inferred from the existing provisions.7 Under the impres-
sion that there was no constitutional issue involved, Congress in-
cluded such a provision when it passed a complete revision of the 
military laws the following year.8 The provision was made as 
narrow as possible to meet the specific need. It provided for court-
martial jurisdiction over an ex-serviceman only for more serious 
crimes (punishable by more than five years' imprisonment), and 
for offenses for which he was not subject to prosecution in the 
federal district courts.9 
Toth was honorably discharged from the Air Force and then 
arrested five months later to be taken to Korea for trial by a court-
martial for murder and conspiracy to commit murder while serv-
ing there.10 In freeing Toth, the Court held that "Congress cannot 
subject civilians like Toth to trial by court-martial. They, like 
other civilians, are entitled to have the benefit of safeguards af-
forded those tried in the regular courts authorized by Article III 
of the Constitution. "11 
5 See, generally, Myers and Kaplan, "Crime Without Punishment," 35 GEo. L.J. 303 
(1947). 
6 United States ex rel. Hirshberg v. Cooke, 336 U.S. 210, 69 S.Ct. 530 (1949), noted in 
48 MICH. L. REv. 234 (1949). Note that article 3 (a) of the Uniform Code was made much 
broader than this case required. The provision may still be valid to permit the exercise 
of jurisdiction if the accused is actually in service, although during a subsequent term, 
when the charges are brought. 
7 336 U.S. 210 at 215-216, 218. 
8 95 CONG. REc. 5721 (1949); 96 CONG. REc. 1367 (1950). 
9 Uniform Code, art. 3 (a). See Martin v. Young, (D.C. Cal. 1955) 134 F. Supp. 204. 
10 Actual offenses charged were violations of Uniform Code, arts. 118 and 81. 
11 United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 at 23, 76 S.Ct. I (1955) (emphasis 
added). 
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Congress' power to legislate in regard to the provision in ques-
tion is derived, as the Court states, from its authority to "make 
rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval 
forces,"12 together with the other more general constitutional pro-
visions relating to the military establishment.13 In the Fifth 
Amendment there is a specific exception made for "cases arising in 
the land and naval forces," so as to obviate the need for grand jury 
indictment and jury trial in such proceedings. Although it is pos-
sible to argue that this language was a limitation on the grant of 
power in Article I, that is, that the constitutionality of court-
martial jurisdiction would turn on the interpretation of "cases 
arising in" the armed forces,14 the Court in the Toth case followed 
a line of authority which holds that the purpose of the exception 
clause was to exempt specifically from the operation of these 
amendments whatever provisions Congress might make under its 
Article I power for regulation through military court proceed-
ings.15 
Both the majority and minority of the Court agreed that the 
decision as to the constitutionality of the particular jurisdictional 
provision must be based on an interpretation of the proper func-
tion of the military tribunal, based as it is on the congressional 
power to make rules for the regulation of the armed forces. Both 
agreed that its existence is predicated on the need to maintain 
discipline among the troops in active service, and that the scope 
of its jurisdiction is therefore limited by the end that it serves. 
The majority of the Court, speaking through Justice Black, 
held that there was not a sufficient connection between the provi-
sion under question and the primary function of the court-martial 
for it to be upheld.16 Justices Reed, Minton,, and Burton, dissent-
ing, felt that the Court went beyond its usual function of determin-
12 U.S. CoNsr., arL I, §8. 
13 See WINTHROP, MILITARY LAw AND PRECEDENTS 16 (1920); ATKISSON, CoNsrrrUTIONAL 
SOURCES OF THE LAws OF WAR (1917). 
14 This was in fact the controversy in the two lines of lower court authority cited in 
note I supra. 
15 United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 at 14, n. 5, 76 S.Ct. I (1955); Ex 
parte Milligan, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 2 (1866). 
16 The majority stresses in this regard that any jurisdiction allowed the military tri-
bunals is an encroachment on that of the Article Ill courts and, more particularly, a 
consequent deprivation of the jury trial guaranteed in those courts, and therefore even 
the specific grant of authority to Congress to regulate the armed forces must be construed 
as narrowly as possible. That a right which is not considered fundamental enough to be 
included in Fourteenth Amendment due process guarantees in state courts should be the 
controlling factor in the denial of military jurisdiction seems difficult to justify. See 
discussion in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 at 325, 58 S.CL 149 (1937). 
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ing whether or not the means chosen by Congress are reasonably 
adapted to the end to be served. In addition to this general 
criticism of the basis of the majority opinion, the minority were 
willing to uphold the provision even under the strict standard 
laid down by the decision. They felt that the majority holding dis-
regarded the fact that a limited provision for just such jurisdic-
tion has been enforced as part of American military law since 
1863,17 and pointed out that there are similar provisions for mili-
tary jurisdiction in most other countries with legal systems similar 
to our own.18 
II 
On the strength of this decision several civilians who had been 
convicted by military courts for crimes committed while accom-
panying the armed forces abroad sought to overturn their con-
victions, relying on the requirement in the Toth holding that any 
exercise of military jurisdiction be necessary to the maintenance 
of discipline among the troops in active service. They also cited 
the more general language of the court decrying the trial of 
civilians as a class by military tribunals since, the Court had 
pointed out, even the best of military courts were inherently less 
independent than the courts provided for in Article III of the Con-
stitution.19 
When confronted with these cases the Court, speaking through 
Justice Clark, attempted to clarify the Toth holding. That case, 
the Court said, called in question the scope of Congress' power 
to deprive a person of his right to grand jury indictment, jury 
trial, and the other constitutional safeguards, by the exercise of its 
authority to make rules for the regulation of the land and naval 
forces. Justice Clark said that since a citizen overseas could not 
claim these advantages as a matter of right, there was no question 
of whether or not the jurisdiction conferred in the case of depend-
ents was authorized by Congress' military powers. Congress' 
power to legislate concerning Americans abroad is derived from 
17 Act of March 2, 1863, 12 Stat. L. 696, 697; similar provision re-enacted Art. of War 
60, R.S. §1342 (1878); Art. of War 94 (1920), 41 Stat. L. 805; Art. of War 94 (1948), 62 
Stat. L. 640; Articles for the Government of the Navy, Art. 14, (Eleventh), R.S. §1624 
(1878). 
18 United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 at 29, n. 11, 76 S.Ct. 1 (1955). 
Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. (61 U.S.) 65 at 78 (1857), defines Congress' power in terms of 
the manner then and now practiced by civilized nations. 
19 United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 at 17, 76 S.Ct. 1 (1955). 
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its authority in foreign affairs and its control of United States 
citizens, independent of any authority to regulate the armed 
forces.20 Outside the territorial limits of the United States any 
particular grant of jurisdiction to the military courts is subject 
to attack on constitutional grounds only if it is wholly unreason-
able in view of all the circumstances.21 
The Court rested its holding in the Krueger and Covert cases 
on its earlier decision in In re Ross.,22 which approved the exercise 
by a consular court in Japan of criminal jurisdiction over an 
American citizen without the procedural safeguards required in 
Article III courts. This decision, together with a long line of 
cases upholding Congress' plenary power to legislate regarding 
American overseas possessions,23 led the Court to the conclusion 
that persons situated as the military dependents were may be 
tried in legislative courts established by Congress.24 In the Court's 
approval of the jurisdictional provision in question particular 
stress was placed upon the relation of the petitioners to the opera-
tion of the military establishment, the very criterion which had 
been suggested by the Toth decision. The investigation in the 
Krueger case, however, was not for the purpose of determining 
whether the jurisdiction was properly provided for in pursuance 
of Congress' power to regulate the military establishment, but 
rather whether the connection between the petitioners and the 
operations of the military was sufficient to reject any contention 
that the use of the military tribunal was arbitrary or capricious. 
That this connection was a significant factor in the present holding 
is emphasized by the Court's extended discussion of the nature 
and scope of our overseas military operations.215 The Court said 
that it was not passing on the power of Congress to provide for 
similar trials for Americans sojourning, touring, or temporarily 
residing abroad, not on the constitutional limitations on the juris-
20 See, generally, discussion of cases in Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 at 73, 61 S.Ct. 
924 (1941). See, generally, CORWIN, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 308, 309, 277-279 
(1952). It was this general power of Congress, and no special power obtained by treaty, 
which was involved, as pointed out by the Court. Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470 at 480, 
76 S.Ct. 886 (1956). 
21 Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470 at 476 ff., 76 S.Ct. 886 (1956). 
22 140 U.S. 453 at 464, 11 S.Ct. 897 (1891). See, generally, CORWIN, CoNSTITIITION OF 
THE UNITED STATES 877 (1952). Cf. Neely v •. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 21 S.Ct. 302 (1901); 
Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 72 S.Ct. 699 (1952). See, generally, Fairman, "Some New 
Problems of the Constitution Following the Flag," 1 STAN. L. R.Ev. 587 (1949). 
23 See cases cited in Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470 at 474, 475, 76 S.Ct. 886 (1956). 
24 Id. at 476. 
25 Id. at 477, n. 7. 
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diction of military courts sitting in this country.26 While the Court 
approved the Ross holding in principle, it was not willing to go be-
yond the situations actually before it in the Krueger and Covert 
cases, in which there was a very close connection between the per-
sons involved and the military establishment, in approving the use 
by Congress of the military courts to try civilians for overseas 
offenses. 
III 
The three decisions taken together lay down skeleton rules 
by which the constitutionality of the present jurisdictional pro-
visions of the uniform code may be tested. They say that Congress 
can confer jurisdiction on military courts in derogation of a per-
son's right to the kind of trial he would have in the federal courts 
only when such jurisdiction is necessary to maintain discipline 
among troops in active service. In addition, Congress can use 
the military courts as a means of exercising its jurisdiction over 
American citizens who are outside the territorial limits of the 
United States, perhaps subject to the limitation that the persons 
subjected to military jurisdiction have a certain connection with 
the operation of the military establishment. 
The jurisdictional provisions of the Uniform Code, excluding 
the one invalidated in the Toth case, may be classified in two 
groups: 
(1) Jurisdiction based on present or former membership in 
the armed forces: 
(a) All members of a regular component of the armed 
forces; 
(b) Personnel of the Coast and Geodetic Survey, Public 
Health Service, or other organization assigned to or 
serving with the armed forces; 
(c) Cadets and midshipmen; 
( d) Reserve personnel on inactive duty trammg, if 
under written orders voluntarily accepted by them 
specifying that they are so subject; 
(e) Members of Fleet and Fleet Marine Reserves; 
(f) Persons serving court-martial sentences in military 
custody; 
(g) Prisoners of war in military custody; 
26 Id. at 480. 
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(h) Retired reserve personnel receiving armed forces 
hospitalization; 
(i) Retired regular personnel entitled to receive pay; 
G) Persons who have terminated their service status il-
legally: 
(1) Deserters from the armed forces; 
(2) Persons charged with having procured their 
discharge fraudulently. 
(2) Jurisdiction over certain groups of civilians because of 
association with, or proximity to, the armed forces: 
(a) In wartime, all persons serving with or accompany-
ing the armed forces in the field; 
(b) In war or peacetime outside the United States, 
Alaska, Puerto Rico, Canal Zone, and Hawaiian 
and Virgin Islands, all persons who are serving with, 
employed by, or accompanying the armed forces, or 
who are within an area under control of a Secretary 
of the Defense Department.27 
Since the code is applicable in all places,28 it is not the locus 
of the offense, but the status of the person as set out above which 
is the controlling element of military jurisdiction. Except for 
certain breaches of military discipline which can only be committed 
by military personnel, all of the above persons are subject to 
prosecution for all non-capital crimes and offenses for which they 
would be triable in a federal court29 in addition to an exhaustive 
list of specified offenses, including all the more serious crimes.80 
The Court has given no indication that it would limit court-
martial jurisdiction by a denial of the right to try certain offenses, 
so the present consideration must be whether or not jurisdiction 
27 Uniform Code, arts. 2, 3. These provisions are in addition to art. 3 (a) involved in 
the Toth case. An additional provision, Uniform Code, art. 4, provides for a post-dismissal 
court-martial hearing on application of an officer, but this is not basically a criminal 
jurisdiction. See Wallace v. United States, 55 Ct. Cl. 396, affd. 257 U.S. 541, 42 S.Ct. 221 
(1922). In addition to these more common provisions, the code provides that all persons 
shall be subject to court-martial jurisdiction for the commission of certain offenses: (1) 
aiding the enemy (art. 104); (2) spying in time of war (art. 106); (3) contempt of court• 
martial (art. 48). These provisions appear fully justified as an exercise of the war power, 
and of ordinary contempt powers. 
Article 18 also includes a general provision for court-martial trial of all persons who 
are subject thereto by the law of war. Under the present view of the Court, this probably 
is no significant aid to extending jurisdiction. But see Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. I, 63 S.Ct. 
1 (1942). -
28 Uniform Code, art. 5. 
29 Uniform Code, art. 134. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES 383 (1951). 
so Uniform Code, arts. 80-132 inclusive. There is thus a duplication as to many offenses 
by specific enumeration and by incorporation by reference of the federal criminal code. 
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over each particular group of persons is justified by the need to 
maintain discipline among the active troops,31 or by Congress' 
power to control American citizens overseas. 
It seems advisable to determine first whether there are any 
provisions which must necessarily fall because of their similarity 
to the provision held unconstitutional in the Toth case. The only 
provision close enough to be affected necessarily by that decision 
is the one for trial of a fraudulent dischargee for his fraud in 
securing his discharge and for previously committed crimes. All 
connection with the military would have been severed, and he 
could be tried just as well for both the fraud and previously com-
mitted crimes in a civilian court.32 In all the other jurisdictional 
groups there is some present relation to the military, even if it 
is only the receipt of retirement pay, so that in these instances any 
finding of unconstitutionality must come from an application of 
the more general standard suggested by the language of the Toth 
holding. 
Two of the remaining categories of service-connected jurisdic-
tion would be subject to the same criticism that the Court leveled 
against the result in the Toth case. In most instances, offenses 
committed by a retired regular army officer or a retired member 
of the reserve who is receiving armed forces hospitalization would 
be just as competently tried in a civilian court, and such trial 
would result in no disruption of any military routine. However, 
it is very likely that the military will be even more hesitant to 
exercise their potential jurisdiction in such cases now than they 
have been in the past, for they have shown that they are sensitive 
to popular sentiment and the practical difficulties involved.38 
Thus, the Court will probably have no opportunity to pass on 
the constitutionality of such provisions except in the rare case 
where the connection to military operations was so close as to lead 
to an assertion of jurisdiction, and this very fact would make it 
difficult for the Court to invalidate the provision. 
The remaining service-connected jurisdictional classifications 
are generally consistent with a minimum conception of court-
31 0£ course, whenever the standard of the Toth case is applied to a jurisdictional 
category, it must be understood to be applicable only to persons within the territorial 
limits of the United States. 
32 It is possible to say that since the discharge was voidable, there was still a subsisting 
relation to the military, but in any case this provision would fall before the more general 
principle of the Toth case requiring an intimate present relation with military operations. 
ss The military opposed even the specific grant of jurisdiction in the provision held 
invalid in the Toth decision. See 96 CONG. REc. 1294 (1950). 
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martial jurisdiction, i.e., a parallel system of courts to provide for 
maintaining military discipline by an especially qualified tribunal, 
and for punishing criminal offenses where assertion of civilian 
jurisdiction and punishment would be inconsistent with the re-
gime under which the persons involved are living.34 As the Court 
itself has said, they belong to a "separate community recognized 
by the Constitution."35 
The code provision for military jurisdiction over all civilians 
serving with or accompanying the armed forces in the field in war-
time is hardly open to question, for it is one of the oldest provisions 
in our military law.36 It is justified within the United States by 
the standard of the Toth case as well as by Congress' extensive 
war powers, and without the United States requires an even higher 
degree of association with military operations than the provision 
upheld in the Krueger decision. 
34 l (a) [The numbering is that used in the text, not that of the code.] The problems 
arising under this section are generally ones of statutory interpretation, not of constitu-
tional limitation. The general rule is that servicemen are subject to military law from 
oath to discharge or separation. See Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U.S. 542, 64 S.Ct. 737 (1944); 
United States ex rel. Hirshberg v. Cooke, 336 U.S. 210, 69 S.Ct. 530 (1949); Hironimus v. 
Durant, (4th Cir. 1948) 168 F. (2d) 288, cert. den. 335 U.S. 818, 69 S.Ct. 40 (1948). 
(b) Such persons are considered part of the branch of the service with which they are 
serving during the limited period for which they are attached. 
(c) See Hartigan v. United States, 196 U.S. 169, 25 S.Ct. 204 (1905). As with the 
previous section, this jurisdiction has given rise to very little litigation in the federal 
courts. 
(d) These persons are actually troops in active service at the time they are subject 
to the code. Congress inserted the special notice provision so as to remove any uncertainty 
as to when they were actually so serving. 
(e) This is a special category, with no counterpart in the Army or Air Force, to 
which regulars may be transferred after long service. [See 52 Stat. L. 1178 (1938), 34 
U.S.C. (1952) §854.] Since the language of the section is not limited to those who are on 
active or training duty, it is to this extent subject to constitutional attack. This jurisdic-
tion terminates on retirement. SNEDEKER, MILITARY JusnCE UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE 126 
(1953). 
(f) This has been specifically upheld by the Court, Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U.S. I, 
41 S.Ct. 224 (1920), and was reaffirmed in Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487, 76 S.Ct. 880 (1956). 
(g) This is simply declaratory of international law, and is subject to applicable treaty 
provisions. See SNEDEKER, MILITARY JusnCE UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE 138 (1953). 
(j) (1) This provision was prompted by a federal court holding that discharge 
from a subsequent term of service insulated the person involved from prosecution for 
desertion from a former term. Ex parte Drainer, (D.C. Cal. 1946) 65 F. Supp. 410. The 
ordinary deserter is adequately covered under other legislation which extends the person's 
period of service by the amount of absent time. 41 Stat. L. 809 (1920), 10 U.S.C. (1952) 
§629. 
85 Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365 at 390, 22 S.Ct. 181 (1902). 
36 This is derived from the original 1775 code provisions. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAw 
AND PRECEDENTS 98 (1920). See also 96 CONG. REc. 1294 (1950). This jurisdiction was 
upheld in Perlstein v. United States,. (3d Cir. 1945) 151 F. (2d) 167, cert. dismissed 328 
U.S. 822, 66 S.Ct. 1358 (1946). It is, in effect, a very extensive grant of power in view of 
the interpretation given to the phrase "in the field." See Hines v. Mikell, (4th Cir. 1919) 
259 F. 28 at 34, where it was applied to temporary training camp in the United States. 
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The Krueger decision appears to give almost unreserved ap-
proval to the remaining provisions for jurisdiction over civilians 
serving with, employed by, or accompanying the armed forces 
abroad, or who are within an overseas area under control of a 
Secretary of the Defense Department. The only provision which 
might be challenged consistently with the Court's opinion in the 
Krueger case would be that conferring jurisdiction over all persons 
within certain overseas areas without mention of their relation 
to the military. However, since these areas are those under the 
control of the Defense Department, a sufficient connection could 
well be found to meet the Court's test. 
Conclusion 
After rendering an opinion in the Toth case which appeared 
to undermine several major areas of court-martial jurisdiction, the 
Court in the Krueger case limited its earlier decision, and proceed-
ed to reinforce on entirely separate grounds the grants of military 
jurisdiction which had been questioned on the authority of the 
Toth holding. Justices Reed, Minton, and Burton, who dissented 
in the Toth decision, were joined by Justices Clark and Harlan in 
reaffirming court-martial jurisdiction over a very large group of 
civilians, thus showing clearly that the Toth decision was not to 
be taken as indicating a general tendency on the part of the Court 
to confine military jurisdiction to the narrowest possible limits. 
The extremely far-reaching principle underlying the Kr11,eger 
decision, i.e., that an American citizen overseas cannot demand the 
same protection there in prosecutions in United States courts for 
federal crimes that he can while in this country, was not elaborated 
by the Court. It is entirely possible that the Court would in a later 
instance stress one of the particular factors of the situation involved 
in the Krueger and Covert cases, e.g., the voluntary nature of 
military dependents' sojourn abroad, or perhaps the really inti-
mate connection of the persons here involved with the military 
establishment, and thereby in effect distinguish these cases and the 
earlier consular authority cases upon which they were based. For 
example, in a case in which continued employment with the 
government depended on accepting these conditions when an 
employee was transferred overseas, or if Congress found it ex-
pedient to provide for court-martial jurisdiction over all crimes 
committed by Americans abroad, the Court might well say that 
this was an unconstitutional condition to work or travel abroad. 
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This possibility is indicated by the Court's reservation in the 
Krueger case of the right to find certain grants of jurisdiction 
"arbitrary or capricious."37 This is reinforced by the specific 
limitation of the Krueger holding to jurisdiction over military 
dependents, although on the surface the opinion appears to affirm 
beyond recall a principal of much broader application. 
In the Toth case the Court announced a standard which may 
be applied to limit grants of court-martial jurisdiction in deroga-
tion of the right to trial in an Article III court, or at least in-
dicated its general attitude toward the exercise of Congress' power 
to make rules for t4e regulation of the armed services. The 
Krueger opinion opened up a wider sphere of court-martial juris-
diction over civilians by affirming on independent grounds a grant 
made by Congress supposedly in pursuance of its military authority. 
If Congress seeks to exercise the power which the Krueger decision 
seems to affirm it possesses, the Court may well be called upon 
again to elaborate the principle upon which that decision was 
based. 
Whitmore Gray, S.Ed. 
37 Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470 at 478, 76 S.Ct. 886 (1956). 
